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JURISDICTION IN EMPLOYMENT MATTERS UNDER
BRUSSELS I: A REASSESSMENT
UGLJEŠA GRUŠIC´*
Abstract This article examines the rules of jurisdiction in employment
matters of Brussels I. It focuses on a paradox in that these rules aim to protect
employees jurisdictionally, but in fact fail to accord employees a more
favourable treatment when they need it most, namely when they appear as
claimants. The article argues that the current rules fail to achieve the objective
of employee protection, examines the reasons for this, proposes certain
amendments that would improve the existing rules, and thereby engages in the
debate surrounding the forthcoming review of Brussels I.
I. INTRODUCTION
The structure of Section 5 of Chapter II of Brussels I1 is simple. On the one
hand, there is one set of jurisdictional rules applicable when employees act as
claimants. In general terms, an employee may commence proceedings:
. in the courts of the employer’s domicile;2
. in the courts for the habitual place of work;3
. if there is no habitual place of work, in the courts of the engaging place of
business;4
* PhD candidate, London School of Economics and Political Science. I am grateful to Professor
Hugh Collins, Professor Trevor Hartley, Dr Jan Kleinheisterkamp and Dr Jacco Bomhoﬀ for
helpful comments. An earlier draft of this article was presented at the Journal of Private
International Law Colloquium held at Griﬃth University in October 2010.
1 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1 (Brussels I or
Regulation). The rules of jurisdiction in employment matters of the Convention on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters done at Lugano on
30 October 2007 [2009] OJ L147/1 (2007 Lugano Convention) are identical to those Brussels I and
are not analysed speciﬁcally. The relevant provisions of the Convention on jurisdiction and the
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters signed at Brussels on 27 September
1968 [1998] OJ L27/1 (Brussels Convention) and the Convention on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters done at Lugano on 16
September 1988 [1988] OJ L319/9 (1988 Lugano Convention) are mentioned only to the extent to
which they diﬀer from those of Brussels I. This article does not deal with the jurisdictional rules of
the Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services [1997] OJ
L18/1. 2 Brussels I, art 19(1).
3 ibid art 19(2)(a). 4 ibid art 19(2)(b).
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. regarding a dispute arising out of the operations of the employer’s branch,
agency or other establishment, in the courts for the place of that
establishment;5 and
. on a counter-claim, in the court in which the original claim is pending.6
On the other hand, there is another set of jurisdictional rules applicable when
employees act as defendants. In this case, an employer may commence
proceedings:
. in the courts of the employee’s domicile;7 and
. on a counter-claim, in the court in which the original claim is pending.8
A jurisdiction agreement entered into before the dispute has arisen is not given
eﬀect if it reduces the number of forums that are available to the employee or if
it increases the number of forums that are available to the employer.9
The objective of these rules is employee protection. As recital 13 in the
Preamble to Brussels I states, ‘In relation to . . . employment, the weaker party
should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests
than the general rules provide for.’ The goal seems clear: the special rules
should protect employees and be more favourable to their interests than the
general rules.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgment in GlaxoSmithKline v
Rouard10 cast doubt upon the achievement of this objective. Mr Rouard
worked for two companies in the same group. One was domiciled in France,
the other in the United Kingdom. The work was performed in Africa.
Following his dismissal, Mr Rouard brought proceedings in France, the French
courts having jurisdiction over the French company. Mr Rouard further sought
to join the UK company as co-defendant pursuant to article 6(1) of Brussels I.
Had the claimant not been an employee, article 6(1) would undoubtedly have
been an available basis of jurisdiction. But the ECJ found that Section 5 of
Chapter II of Brussels I is exhaustive. The Court relied primarily on the
wording of article 18(1): ‘In matters relating to individual contracts of
employment, jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without
prejudice to Article 4 and point 5 of Article 5’.11 Since the provisions of this
Section neither referred to article 6(1) nor prescribed a rule for co-defendants,
the ECJ held that this generally available head of jurisdiction could not be
invoked by Mr Rouard. Evidently, the special rules did not aﬀord the employee
any protection and were not more favourable to his interests than the general
rules. On the contrary, they were less favourable.12
5 ibid art 18(1). Although, in theory, claimant employers can also invoke this jurisdictional
rule, this is practically impossible, since employees do not have ‘branches, agencies or other
establishments’. 6 ibid art 20(2).
7 ibid art 20(1). 8 ibid art 20(2). 9 ibid art 21.
10 Case C–462/06, [2008] ECR I–3965. 11 ibid paras 18–19.
12 The rules of jurisdiction in employment matters of the Brussels and 1988 Lugano
Conventions were not set out in separate, self-contained sections. Hence, art 6(1) of these
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This judgment has received strong criticism throughout Europe.13 The
European Commission has also acknowledged the problem and proposed an
amendment to Brussels I that would make the rule of jurisdiction over co-
defendants available to claimant employees.14 No other changes to the rules of
jurisdiction in employment matters are contemplated by the Commission. The
satisfaction with the general operation of these rules echoes the conclusions of
the Heidelberg Report on the application of Brussels I:15 ‘No major problems
[in relation to the rules of jurisdiction in employment matters] could be
discovered . . .’;16 ‘None of the open issues [regarding the rules of jurisdiction
in employment matters] are of a dimension justifying the conclusion that an
amendment being drafted is self-suggesting . . .’.17
This article puts forward a diﬀerent argument: that the jurisdictional rules of
Brussels I fail to achieve the objective of employee protection, and should
consequently be amended. The following section presents the evolution of
these jurisdictional rules. Next the question of what the rules of private
international law dealing with adjudicative jurisdiction should provide to
achieve the objective of employee protection is considered, followed by a
demonstration of how Brussels I fails to give employees a jurisdictional
preference when they need it most, namely when they appear as claimants.
Finally, possibilities for improvement are discussed.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE RULES OF JURISDICTION IN EMPLOYMENT MATTERS
The original 1968 version of the Brussels Convention did not contain any
special rules on employment matters. It did, however, contain protective
jurisdictional rules for matters relating to insurance (Section 3 of Title II) and
instalment sales and loans (Section 4 of Title II). Yet the drafters of the
Convention did consider prescribing special protective rules for employment
disputes: the preliminary draft contained a provision giving exclusive
jurisdiction to the courts either for the place in which the undertaking con-
cerned was situated or that in which the work was or was to be performed.18
Conventions was an available basis of jurisdiction in employment disputes: see Carasset-Marillier
v Salahadin Imam et autres, French Cour de cassation, 13 January 1998 <http://curia.europa.eu/
common/recdoc/convention/en/1998/27-1998.htm> .
13 See S Frodl, ‘Rechtssicherheit vor Arbeitnehmerschutz?’ (2009) 21 Österreichische
Juristenzeitung 935; J Harris, ‘The Brussels I Regulation, the ECJ and the Rulebook’ (2008) 124
LQRev 523; F Jault-Seseke, ‘GlaxoSmithKline v Rouard’ (2008) 97 Revue critique de droit
international privé 853; S Krebber, ‘Einheitlicher Gerichtsstand für die Klage eines Arbeitnehmers
gegen mehrere Arbeitgeber bei Beschäftigung in einem grenzüberschreitenden Konzern’ (2009) 19
Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 409.
14 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast)’ COM (2010) 748/3, 11–12.
15 B Hess, T Pfeiﬀer and P Schlosser, ‘Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I
in the Member States’ (September 2007) <http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_
application_brussels_1_en.pdf> . 16 ibid para 311.
17 ibid para 359. 18 Jenard Report [1979] OJ C59/1, 24.
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But this provision was omitted from the ﬁnal draft for two reasons. First, at that
time work was in progress to harmonize the choice-of-law rules for employ-
ment contracts within the EEC. It was thought that the jurisdictional rules
should follow the choice-of-law rules, and therefore the adoption of the special
rules of jurisdiction in employment matters was postponed.19 Secondly, there
was no agreement between the drafters on the question of whether and to what
extent party autonomy should be allowed.20 Consequently, the general
jurisdictional rules were made applicable in employment disputes.
The lack of jurisdictional protection of employees led to certain problems in
practice. On the one hand, jurisdiction agreements were given full eﬀect in
employment disputes irrespective of the shortcomings of party autonomy in
international employment contracts. On the other hand, the general rule of
jurisdiction in contractual matters of article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention
proved to be ill-suited to employment disputes.
The problem with jurisdiction agreements was revealed by Sanicentral
GmbH v Collin.21 Mr Collin was a Frenchman domiciled in France who
worked for Sanicentral, a German company. The employment contract, which
contained a jurisdiction clause in favour of German courts, was concluded and
terminated before the entry into force of the Brussels Convention; however, the
employee brought proceedings in France after its entry into force. He tried to
invoke a provision of French law invalidating jurisdiction agreements in em-
ployment contracts such as the one at hand. After concluding that the dispute
fell within the substantive and temporal scope of the Convention,22 the ECJ
held that the provisions of this instrument took precedence over the provisions
of national procedural laws.23 Since the requirements of the Convention were
satisﬁed, the jurisdiction agreement was upheld and the French court was
required to decline jurisdiction. This judgment put employees in an unfavour-
able position since it enabled employers to (ab)use their typically superior
bargaining power and impose upon their employees the jurisdiction of the
courts favourable to them. The only requirements that such jurisdiction agree-
ments had to fulﬁl were the formal requirements of article 17 of the
Convention.24
The unsuitability of article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention for employment
disputes was discussed in the groundbreaking case of Ivenel v Schwab.25 This
case concerned a dispute between Mr Ivenel, a French commercial represen-
tative, and his German employer over payment of commission and other sums
of money. Mr Ivenel performed his work in France, but the commission and
19 ibid. 20 ibid.
21 Case 25/79 [1979] ECR 3423. See also Case 150/80 Elefanten Schuh GmbH v Jacqmain
[1981] ECR 1671.
22 Sanicentral (n 21) para 3. 23 ibid para 5.
24 See arts 12 and 15 of the 1968 version of the Brussels Convention regarding the
requirements for validity of jurisdiction agreements in insurance contracts and instalment sales and
loans contracts. 25 Case 133/81 [1982] ECR 1891.
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other sums were payable in Germany. The proceedings were brought in France.
Article 5(1) conferred jurisdiction in contractual matters upon the courts ‘for
the place where the obligation was, or was to be, performed’. The jurisdiction
of the French court thus depended on which obligation (to work or to pay) was
the jurisdictionally relevant obligation, and on its place of performance. The
ECJ had previously held that the obligation to be taken into account for the
purposes of article 5(1) was the obligation forming the basis of the claim,26 and
that the place of performance of that obligation was to be determined by
applying the law designated by the choice-of-law rules of the forum.27 Since
the basis of Mr Ivenel’s claim was the employer’s obligation of payment, and
since under both French and German law the commission and other sums were
payable at the address of the debtor, it seemed that article 5(1) could only give
jurisdiction to the German courts. However, the ECJ found that this
interpretation would be contrary to the Convention’s objectives of proximity
and protection of weaker parties. It would give jurisdiction to the courts of the
country where the work was not performed and that were not closely connected
with the dispute,28 the courts of the country whose law was not applicable29
and where the employer had his domicile. The ECJ therefore departed from the
language of article 5(1) and the preceding case law, and held that the
jurisdictionally relevant obligation regarding employment contracts was
always the obligation that characterised the contract, namely the obligation to
perform work.30 It was also implicit in Ivenel that the place of work was to be
determined autonomously and not by reference to the law applicable under the
choice-of-law rules of the forum.31 Thus, the French court had jurisdiction.
These two deﬁciencies of the 1968 version of the Brussels Convention were
remedied in the 1988 Lugano Convention, which expanded the ‘Brussels
system’ to EFTA Member States. First, the problem of jurisdiction agreements
contained in international employment contracts was resolved through the
insertion of a rule that denied eﬀect to such agreements entered into before the
dispute had arisen.32 Secondly, article 5(1) of the 1988 Lugano Convention
introduced a special rule of jurisdiction in employment matters alongside the
general rule of jurisdiction in contractual matters. This special rule aimed to
incorporate the ECJ case law, and particularly the Ivenel case. Since the ruling
in this case was largely inﬂuenced by the fact that article 5(1) of the 1968
Brussels Convention did not give jurisdiction to the courts of the country
whose law was applicable pursuant to article 6 of the Rome Convention,33 the
26 Case 14/76 De Bloos v Bouyer [1976] ECR 1497.
27 Case 12/76 Tessili v Dunlop [1976] ECR 1473.
28 Ivenel (n 25) para 15. 29 ibid paras 13–15, 19.
30 ibid para 20; see also Case 266/85 Shenavai v Kreischer [1987] ECR 239.
31 This was conﬁrmed in Case C–125/92 Mulox IBC Ltd v Geels [1993] ECR I–4075, paras
12–16. 32 1988 Lugano Convention, art 17(5).
33 Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations done at Rome on 19 June 1980
[1998] OJ C27/34 (Rome Convention). Art 6 of the Rome Convention provided that an
employment contract was governed, in the absence of choice, by the law of the country in which the
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drafters of the 1988 Lugano Convention decided that the rule of jurisdiction in
employment matters should follow this article of the Rome Convention.34
Thus, the new jurisdictional rule provided not only that ‘in matters relating to
individual contracts of employment, [the place of performance of the
obligation in question] is that where the employee habitually carries out his
work’, but also that ‘if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in
any one country, this place shall be the place of business through which he was
engaged’.
However, these new jurisdictional rules of the 1988 Lugano Convention had
shortcomings of their own. First, this instrument denied any eﬀect to juris-
diction clauses contained in international employment contracts entered into
before the dispute had arisen, irrespective of whether they were beneﬁcial for
employees or not. Secondly, the rule regarding the engaging place of business
was introduced without any assessment of its appropriateness.35 Moreover, this
jurisdictional rule was equally available to both employers and employees.
A further step in the evolution of the rules of jurisdiction in employment
matters occurred in 1989, when the Convention on the accession of Spain
and Portugal to the Brussels Convention was concluded.36 Although this
Convention came along less than a year after the conclusion of the 1988
Lugano Convention, it signiﬁcantly departed from the provisions of the latter
instrument. First, the solution of the 1988 Lugano Convention regarding
jurisdiction agreements was considered ‘too radical’ by the drafters of the
1989 Accession Convention.37 Thus, article 17(5) of the 1989 version of the
Brussels Convention provided that a jurisdiction agreement was eﬀective in an
employment dispute not only if it was entered into after the dispute had arisen
but also if it was favourable for the employee. Secondly, article 5(1) of the
Brussels Convention was amended along the lines of article 5(1) of the 1988
Lugano Convention, with one signiﬁcant diﬀerence: the rule of the engaging
place of business could be invoked only by employees and not by employers.
Furthermore, it was clariﬁed that the jurisdictionally relevant place was not
only where the business that engaged the employee was situated at the moment
of engagement but also where it was situated at the moment of commencement
of proceedings.
The latest stage in the evolution came with Brussels I in 2001. This
instrument introduced several important changes. First, the rules of jurisdiction
employee habitually carried out his work in performance of the contract. If the employee did not
habitually carry out his work in any one country, the employment contract was governed by the law
of the country in which the place of business through which the employee was engaged was
situated (emphasis added).
34 Jenard–Möler Report [1990] OJ C189/57, paras 37, 38, 40.
35 See Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, Convention de Lugano: Convention concernant la
compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale faite à Lugano
le 16 septembre 1988 (Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag 1991) 164–65.
36 [1989] OJ L285/1.
37 Cruz–Real–Jenard Report [1990] OJ C189/35, para 27(d).
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in employment matters were set out in a separate, self-contained section.
Secondly, the rule extending the notion of the employer’s domicile was
introduced in article 18(2). Thirdly, employers lost the right to invoke the rule
conferring jurisdiction on the courts for the habitual place of work. It would
appear that the drafters of the Regulation were of the opinion that the objective
of employee protection could be achieved only if the rules of jurisdiction in
employment matters closely followed the existing rules of jurisdiction
applicable in consumer and insurance disputes.38 However, they failed to
examine the impact that these changes would have on the jurisdictional
position of employees. Similarly, the jurisdictional rules of Brussels I were
simply transposed into the 2007 Lugano Convention without assessment of
their impact.39
To sum up, the reason for the present structure and content of the rules of
jurisdiction in employment matters of Brussels I lies in their haphazard
evolution. These rules were introduced and amended with the objective of
employee protection in mind; the following two sections will examine whether
they achieve that goal.
III. RULES OF JURISDICTION AND PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES
Brussels I clearly introduces a jurisdictional imbalance in favour of employees.
However, does this imbalance actually result in eﬀective jurisdictional
protection for employees? This section looks ﬁrst at the theory of private
international law and explores the concept of jurisdictional protection of
employees. The practical importance of the jurisdictional favouring of claimant
employees is then examined.
A. Jurisdictional Protection of Employees
There are various factors that make a forum more attractive to one party than
another in an international employment dispute: operation of choice-of-law
rules, existence of specialised labour courts or tribunals, system of legal fees,
availability of legal aid, methods of obtaining and location of evidence,
geographical proximity, neutrality (or even bias towards a party), cultural or
legal tradition and the like.40 Parties normally seek to pursue their claims or
38 The rules applicable in these two types of dispute had been contained in separate, self-
contained sections (3 and 4 of Title II) since the adoption of the Brussels Convention in 1968.
Under this instrument, consumers and insured persons could normally be sued only in the courts of
their domicile (arts 11(1) and 14(2)), and there was a rule extending the notion of the insurer’s
domicile (art 18(2)). See European Commission, ‘Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the
proposal of the Brussels I Regulation’, COM (1999) 348 ﬁnal, 17.
39 Pocar Report [2009] OJ C319/1, paras 85–90.
40 AT von Mehren, ‘Theory and Practice of Adjudicatory Authority in Private International
Law: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine, Policies and Practices of Common- and Civil-Law
Systems’ (2002) 295 Recueil des Cours 9, 194–96.
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defend their cases in the forums that are most advantageous for them according
to these factors. Given that it is claimants who ordinarily select the forum when
initiating proceedings, the parties’ litigational positions ultimately depend
upon the number and diversity of available bases of jurisdiction. The more
available and diverse the bases, the greater the chance that the claimant will
pursue their claim in an advantageous forum (but also that the defendant will
have to defend their case in a disadvantageous forum).
As Arthur Taylor von Mehren rightly noted:
The highest ideal of procedural justice in civil matters is that . . . each party should
be treated equally . . . [W]here the parties are considered essentially equal in
litigational capacity and neither’s claim to corrective justice is thought to be
stronger than the other’s, neither should be accorded a jurisdictional preference.41
Where the parties are of essentially unequal litigational capacity, however,
there are compelling reasons to protect the weaker party by granting them a
jurisdictional preference. Otherwise, equal treatment of the two parties could
lead to unjust results.
The manner of achieving corrective justice in employment matters depends
on whether employees, as a typically weaker category of litigants, act as claim-
ants or as defendants. In the former situation, one or more bases of jurisdiction
could be made available to them in addition to those available to claimants
in general. In the latter situation, employers could be denied the use of
some generally available jurisdictional bases.42 Furthermore, the judgment of
a foreign court that has unjustiﬁably assumed jurisdiction over an employee
could be refused recognition and enforcement. The purpose of such measures
is to ensure that employees are able to present their claims in favourable
forums, and do not have to defend their cases in inaccessible and unfamiliar
forums.
The objective of employee protection, however, is not the only goal that the
rules of jurisdiction in employment matters seek to achieve. These rules should
accord with two further considerations: proportionality and vindication of
important State interests.43 Proportionality seeks to ensure, among other things,
that the jurisdictional preference given to employees is not overly burdensome
for employers. The forums that are made available to employees should be
appropriate in terms of having suﬃcient connection with the parties or the
claim, but also no more numerous than is required to achieve corrective justice.
Moreover, barring employers from accessing certain forums should not exceed
what is necessary for this purpose. The second consideration arises from the
States’ interests in having their courts adjudicate the disputes that touch sig-
niﬁcantly upon their policies. The choice-of-law rules for employment con-
tracts are normally designed in such a way as to ensure the application of the
law of the country that is closely connected with the employment contract in
41 ibid 197. 42 ibid 200–03. 43 ibid 68.
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question and interested in regulating it.44 It follows that, in principle, the
choice-of-law rules for employment contracts and rules of jurisdiction in
employment matters should be complementary and, where possible, point to
the law and courts of the same country.45 This is an especially important con-
cern given that many States have set up specialized labour courts or tribunals,
often with worker representation, that are not experienced in applying foreign
law. However, the importance of this concern should not be exaggerated. There
are many employment disputes where the forum and ius do not coincide.46
Therefore, in order to be jurisdictionally protected, employees should be
accorded a balanced jurisdictional preference when they appear in court,
whether as claimants or defendants.
B. Importance, in Practice, of Jurisdictionally Preferring
Claimant Employees
Indisputably, Brussels I protects employees whenever they act as defendants.
An employer can ordinarily bring proceedings only in the courts of the em-
ployee’s domicile.47 This guarantees that employees will not have to defend
their cases in foreign, potentially inaccessible and unfamiliar courts. An em-
ployee may be sued outside his home country only if he consents to the
jurisdiction of a foreign court after the dispute has arisen. Article 21 is explicit
in this regard: a jurisdiction agreement purporting to confer jurisdiction over an
employee on the courts of a country other than that of the employee’s domicile
is given eﬀect only if entered post litem natam. The general requirements of
article 23 must also be satisﬁed.48 In practice it may be diﬃcult to determine
when an employment dispute has arisen. The Jenard Report suggests that this
occurs ‘as soon as the parties disagree on a speciﬁc point and legal proceedings
are imminent or contemplated’.49 The rationale of this rule is that an employee
who has a speciﬁc dispute with his or her employer is in a position to assess the
pros and cons of litigation in various countries. He or she will not easily give
up the privilege of defending in his or her home country, and will accept the
jurisdiction of a foreign court only if he or she considers that to be in his or her
44 eg Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6 (Rome I), arts 8
(safeguarding the application of the mandatory employment rules of the objectively applicable law)
and 9 (giving preference over the applicable law to the overriding mandatory provisions of the
forum and, under certain conditions, even of the country of performance); Second Restatement of
the Conﬂict of Laws, paras 6, 196.
45 See also P Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Clarendon Press 1999) 165.
46 SeeMulox (n 31), Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras 26–28; see also Hess, Pfeiﬀer and Schlosser
(n 15) paras 350–51.
47 Brussels I, art 20(1). According to art 59, domicile of employees is to be determined by
reference to the Member States’ national laws. Under the Brussels and 1988 Lugano Conventions
an employer was not conﬁned to suing the employee in the courts of the latter’s domicile.
48 Schlosser Report [1979] OJ C59/71, para 161.
49 Jenard Report (n 18) 33.
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interest.50 The same rationale underlies the employer’s right to bring a counter-
claim in the court in which the original claim is pending.51 By commencing
proceedings in a foreign court, the employee accepts the jurisdiction of that
court to entertain a counter-claim against him or her. The court in which
the action against the employer is pending must have jurisdiction speciﬁcally
under Section 5 of Chapter II. In addition, the general requirements of
article 6(3) must also be satisﬁed: the counter-claim must arise from the same
contract or facts upon which the original claim was based. The idea of consent
also suggests that an employee can confer jurisdiction upon a court by entering
an appearance.52
Let us suppose for a moment that this is the only jurisdictional preference
that employees receive; in other words, that the jurisdictional preference con-
sists only in denying claimant employers the use of certain generally available
bases of jurisdiction. Would this type of jurisdictional imbalance (favouring
solely defendant but not claimant employees), in and of itself, lead to the
achievement of the objective of employee protection? The answer largely
depends on the relative practical importance of the situations where employees
act as defendants compared to those where they act as claimants.
The relative practical importance of the two types of situation can be
ascertained by looking at the ECJ case law on Brussels I and the Brussels
Convention. So far employees have initiated proceedings in 12 cases.53 In
only two cases have employers done so.54 This suggests that situations
where employees act as claimants are much more frequent than those where
they act as defendants. This conclusion is corroborated by data from certain
national jurisdictions. In Germany, for example, it is estimated that more than
95 per cent of employment disputes are commenced by employees, and less
50 It should be noted that an employee who is sued in the courts of his or her domicile cannot
challenge their jurisdiction by invoking a jurisdiction clause in favour of a foreign court entered
into before the dispute has arisen: Cruz–Real–Jenard Report (n 37) para 27(e)(2). The special rules
therefore slightly disfavour defendant employees in this respect.
51 Brussels I, art 20(2).
52 The fact that the rule of art 24 of Brussels I dealing with submission to jurisdiction by
entering an appearance is neither contained nor referred to in Section 5 of Chapter II is irrelevant:
see Case C–111/09 Cˇeská podnikatelská pojišt’ovna as, Vienna Insurance Group v Michal Bilas
[2010] ECR I–4545 noted by U Grušic´, ‘Submission and Protective Jurisdiction under the
Brussels I Regulation’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 947.
53 Sanicentral (n 21); Elefanten Schuh (n 21); Ivenel (n 25); Case 32/88 Six Constructions Ltd v
Humbert [1989] ECR 341; Mulox (n 31); Case C–383/95 Rutten v Cross Medical Ltd [1997] ECR
I–57; Case C–37/00 Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd [2002] ECR I–2013; Case C–437/00
Pugliese v Finmeccanica SpA [2003] ECR I–3573; Case C–159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I–
3565; Case C–555/03 Warbecq v Ryanair Ltd [2004] ECR I–6041; GlaxoSmithKline (n 10); Case
C–413/07Haase v Superfast Ferries SA [2008] OJ C51/40. See also Case C–29/10Heiko Koelzsch
v État du Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, not yet published in ECR, and Case C–384/10
Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA, not yet published in ECR, dealing with art 6 of the Rome
Convention.
54 Case 288/82 Duijnstee v Goderbauer [1983] ECR 3663. In Turner (n 53), an action brought
by the employee in England was followed by a vexatious action brought by the employer in Spain.
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than 5 per cent by employers.55 For employees, therefore, the jurisdictional
rules applicable when they act as claimants are of a crucial practical
importance.
This impression is shared by the European Commission. We must now turn
brieﬂy to the ﬁeld of recognition and enforcement of judgments. Brussels I
does not allow the court in which recognition and enforcement of a judgment
concerning employment is sought to review the jurisdiction of the court of
origin. This is in striking contrast to the rule that allows such review in matters
relating to insurance and consumer contracts.56 The explanation provided
by the Commission is that any review of the foreign courts’ jurisdiction
would only aﬀect employees, since it is they who generally seek recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments.57 Leaving aside the merits of this
argument,58 suﬃce it to say that it clearly implies that the disputes in which
employees act as defendants are so rare that the protection from wrongful
assumption of jurisdiction over them is unnecessary.
Therefore, since the situations in which employees act as claimants are of a
signiﬁcantly greater practical importance, giving a jurisdictional preference
solely to defendant employees does not suﬃce. Claimant employees should
also be jurisdictionally preferred.
C. Conclusion
Given the theoretical and practical considerations set out in this section, in
order for the objective of employee protection—proclaimed in Recital 13 in the
Preamble to Brussels I—not to be mere lip service, it is not enough that the
special rules accord a jurisdictional preference solely to defendant employees.
It is necessary that these rules also protect claimant employees and that they are
‘more favourable to [claimant employees’] interests than the general rules’. In
other words, claimant employees should be put in a better jurisdictional
position than other claimants in comparable situations. The following section
will examine whether this is the case.
55 A Junker, ‘Vom Brüsseler Übereinkommen zur Brüsseler Verordnung: Wandlungen des
Internationalen Zivilprozessrechts’ (2002) 48 Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 569, 575.
56 Brussels I, art 35(1).
57 Commission, ‘Explanatory Memorandum’ (n 38) 23.
58 See eg B Ancel, ‘The Brussels I Regulation: Comment’ in P Sarcevic and P Volken (eds),
Yearbook of Private International Law, vol 3 (Sellier European Law Publishers 2001) 101, 106–
07; GAL Droz and H Gaudemet-Tallon, ‘La transformation de la Convention de Bruxelles du 27
septembre 1968 en Règlement du Conceil concernant la competence judiciaire, la reconnaissance
et l’exécution des decision en matière civile et commerciale’ (2001) 90 Revue critique de droit
international privé 601, 648; J Hill and A Chong, International Commercial Disputes: Commercial
Conﬂict of Laws in English Courts (4th edn, Hart 2010) 455; AAH van Hoek, ‘Case Note on
Krombach v Bamberski’ (2001) 38 CMLR 1011, 1025; Junker (n 55) 577; P Mankowski,
‘Article 35’ in U Magnus and P Mankowski (eds), Brussels I Regulation (Sellier European Law
Publishers 2007) 601, 616.
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IV. CLAIMANT EMPLOYEES VERSUS OTHER CLAIMANTS: IS THE OBJECTIVE
OF EMPLOYEE PROTECTION YET TO BE ATTAINED?
In order to ascertain whether Brussels I achieves the objective of employee
protection, the position of claimant employees will be compared with the
position of claimants generally. Speciﬁcally, the bases of jurisdiction available
to claimant employees will be compared with those available to other claimants.
A. Employer’s Domicile versus Defendant’s Domicile
An employee may commence proceedings in the Member State where the
employer is domiciled.59 Even if an employer is domiciled outside the EU,
they will be deemed to be domiciled in a Member State where they have a
branch, agency or other establishment (ancillary establishment) in regard to
disputes arising out of the operations of that establishment.60 Similarly, other
claimants may commence proceedings in the Member State where the
defendant is domiciled.61 However, in this instance there can be no extension
of the understanding of the notion of the defendant’s domicile upon which
other claimants can rely. The following text will therefore examine whether the
rule extending the notion of the employer’s domicile accords claimant
employees a jurisdictional preference.
In principle, the jurisdictional rules of Brussels I apply when the defendant
is domiciled in the EU.62 The jurisdiction of the Member States’ courts over
non-EU domiciliaries can normally only be assumed pursuant to the Member
States’ traditional rules, regardless of any ancillary establishment that such
persons might have in the EU. However, the rule extending the notion of the
employer’s domicile brings non-EU employers with European ancillary estab-
lishments within the scope of the Regulation in regard to employment disputes
arising out of the operations of those establishments. This rule aims to protect
employees by guaranteeing that they will be able to commence proceedings
against such non-EU employers in at least one Member State. Otherwise (the
theory goes) the operation of the Member States’ traditional jurisdictional rules
might result in employees not being able to sue such non-EU employers
anywhere in the EU.
What is, however, the practical result of the application of the rule extending
the notion of the employer’s domicile? This rule is applicable in situations such
as the one that arose in Six Constructions Ltd v Humbert.63 Six Constructions
was a company domiciled in the United Arab Emirate of Sharjah. Mr Humbert
59 Brussels I, art 19(1). Domicile of legal persons is deﬁned autonomously in art 60. According
to art 59, domicile of individuals is to be determined by reference to the Member States’ national
laws.
60 ibid art 18(2). The Brussels and 1988 Lugano Conventions did not contain a rule extending
the notion of the employer’s domicile. 61 ibid art 2.
62 ibid. The exceptions are exclusive jurisdiction and jurisdiction agreements: ibid art 4.
63 (n 53).
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was a worker of French nationality and domicile. He was engaged through
Six Constructions’ Belgian branch to work outside the EU. Following his
dismissal, Mr Humbert commenced proceedings in France. If the above-
mentioned rule had been applied in this case, Six Constructions would have
been deemed to be domiciled in Belgium: the employment dispute arose out
of the operations of that company’s Belgian branch because Mr Humbert was
engaged through that branch.64 The French courts would therefore have
been entitled and obliged to apply the jurisdictional rules of Brussels I. Since
Mr Humbert’s work was performed outside the EU, the Regulation would have
provided no basis for the jurisdiction of the French courts. Mr Humbert would
then have been left with the option of bringing proceedings in Belgium (the
country in which the employer would have been deemed to be domiciled),
Sharjah (the country in which the employer was in fact domiciled) or possibly
in Libya, Zaire or in another of the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi (non-EU
countries in which the work was performed).
If the rule extending the notion of the employer’s domicile had not existed,
the Member States’ traditional rules of jurisdiction would have been applicable
in this situation. The French traditional rules would have conferred jurisdiction
upon the French courts, possibly on two accounts.65 First, article 14 of the
French Civil Code enables claimants of French nationality to sue foreign
parties in France. Secondly, the second indent of article R 517-1 of the French
Labour Code gives employees domiciled in France the right to commence
proceedings in France when the work is performed outside any establishment.
It is not clear whether the work in Six Constructions was performed in an
establishment or not. In any event, article 14 of the Civil Code would have
been suﬃcient to give jurisdiction to the French courts.66 In addition, the
Belgian traditional rules would have conferred jurisdiction on the Belgian
courts: article 5(2) of the Belgian Code of Private International Law mirrors
article 5(5) of Brussels I.67
The question whether the rule extending the notion of the employer’s
domicile accords a jurisdictional preference to claimant employees cannot be
answered in the abstract. This rule would not, for example, have beneﬁtted an
64 Six Constructions was decided under the Brussels Convention. It is interesting to note that,
since the ECJ had to assume for procedural reasons that Six Constructions was domiciled in
Belgium, the outcome was the same as if Brussels I, with its rule extending the notion of the
employer’s domicile, had been applied. The requirement that a dispute must arise out of the
operations of the ancillary establishment is discussed below, 26–27.
65 For the French traditional rules of jurisdiction in employment matters see P Mayer, ‘Les
clauses relatives à la compétence internationale insérées dans le contrat du travail’ in Mélanges
dédiés à Dominique Holleaux (Litec 1990) 263.
66 Both bases of jurisdiction can be excluded by a jurisdiction agreement in favour of a foreign
court: see cases cited by Mayer (n 65) 264 (for derogability of art 14 of the French Civil Code),
266–67, 271–72 (for derogability of the second indent of R 517-1 of the French Labour Code). No
valid jurisdiction agreement existed in Six Constructions (n 53): see paras 4–5 of the judgment.
67 See F Rigaux and M Fallon, Droit international privé (3rd edn, Larcier 2005) 995. Art 5(5)
of Brussels I is discussed in part D of this section.
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employee in the shoes of Mr Humbert. On the one hand, it would have given
jurisdiction to the Belgian courts, which would in any case have been
competent under traditional Belgian rules. On the other hand, it would have
precluded such an employee from bringing proceedings in France pursuant to
the French traditional rules. In diﬀerent circumstances, this rule could confer
jurisdiction upon those courts that would otherwise not have it. This is most
likely to occur where the existence of a non-EU employer’s ancillary estab-
lishment in a Member State does not give jurisdiction to that Member State’s
courts pursuant to that country’s traditional rules, even over employment
disputes arising out of the operations of that ancillary establishment. Given that
Greece and Poland seem to be the only countries in the EU that would not give
jurisdiction to their courts on this basis,68 the rule extending the notion of the
employer’s domicile more often than not actually disfavours employees since
it shields non-EU employers with European ancillary establishments from
the Member States’ traditional, often excessive, rules of jurisdiction. Another
extremely rare situation where the rule extending the notion of the employer’s
domicile would give jurisdiction to the courts that would not otherwise have it
exists where an employee is engaged by a non-EU employer through that
employer’s ancillary establishment situated in one Member State to work in
another Member State and the traditional rules of jurisdiction of the latter
Member State do not confer jurisdiction upon its courts in this situation.69
B. Habitual Place of Work versus Place of Provision of Services
The primary rule of jurisdiction in employment matters (conferring jurisdiction
upon the courts for the habitual place of work) will be compared with the rule
of jurisdiction in matters relating to a contract for services. This comparison is
justiﬁed given the similar nature of the two types of contract: under an em-
ployment contract, the employee carries out his or her work and receives salary
in return; under a contract for services, the service provider provides services
and receives remuneration in return.
1. Habitual place of work
An employer domiciled in one Member State may be sued in another Member
State in the courts for the place where the employee habitually carries out his or
her work or for the last place where he or she did so.70 This rule is of practical
68 See A Nuyts, ‘Study on Residual Jurisdiction: General Report’ <http://ec.europa.eu/
civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf> , 36.
69 Not all Member States’ traditional rules give jurisdiction to their courts on the basis of the
habitual place of work: see Nuyts (n 68) 43–46.
70 Brussels I, art 19(2)(a). The wording of art 5(1) of the Brussels and 1988 Lugano
Conventions is slightly diﬀerent as it does not refer to the courts for the last place where the
employee habitually carried out his or her work. This should not, however, result in any practical
diﬀerence between these instruments.
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importance only if there is a habitual place of work in a Member State.71 If a
habitual place of work does not exist, the fallback rule conferring jurisdiction
upon the courts of the engaging place of business applies. If there is a habitual
place of work outside the EU, neither the primary rule of the habitual place of
work nor the fallback rule of the engaging place of business applies.72
The habitual place of work is easily identiﬁable where the work is performed
in one place. However, where the work is carried out in more than one place,
determining the habitual place of work is problematic. The ECJ has dealt with
this problem in the following three cases: Mulox IBC Ltd v Geels, Rutten v
Cross Medical Ltd and Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd.73
Mulox IBC Ltd v Geels74 concerned a dispute between Mulox, an English
company, and Mr Geels, a Dutch national with French domicile. Mr Geels,
who was employed as a commercial representative, used his French home as an
oﬃce and base of operations. In the ﬁrst 14 months of his employment, he sold
Mulox products in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Scandinavia (but
not France), to which countries he travelled frequently. In the last 5 months, he
worked solely in France. Following his dismissal, Mr Geels brought
proceedings in France. The employer argued that the place of performance
was not conﬁned to France, that it covered the whole of Europe and that
consequently the French courts had no jurisdiction. The ECJ held that, where
the work was performed in more than one country, the multiplication of courts
having jurisdiction should be avoided. Jurisdiction should not be conferred
upon the courts of each Member State in which the work was performed,75 and
jurisdiction over the whole dispute should be concentrated at ‘the place where
or from which the employee principally discharges his obligations towards his
employer’.76 The most important factor in determining this place was the fact
that ‘the work entrusted to the employee was carried out from an oﬃce . . . from
which he performed his work and to which he returned after each business
trip’.77 Other relevant factors were the fact that Mr Geels was domiciled in
France and that the work was carried out solely in France before the dispute
arose. The French courts therefore had jurisdiction.
71 Work carried out on ﬁxed or ﬂoating installations positioned on or above the part of the
continental shelf adjacent to a Member State for the purposes of prospecting and exploiting its
natural resources is regarded as work in the territory of that Member State: Weber (n 53).
72 Six Constructions (n 53); Shell International Ltd v Liem [2004] ILPr 18 (French Cour de
Cassation, 21 January 2004); Cruz–Real–Jenard Report (n 37) para 23(e); T Kruger, Civil
Jurisdiction Rules of the EU and their Impact on Third States (OUP 2008) 168, 176.
73 In Pugliese v Finmeccanica SpA (n 53), the ECJ addressed a related question of whether the
habitual place of work under a contract of employment with employer B was relevant in a dispute
arising under a contract of employment with employer A, where employers A and B were related,
and the employment with employer A was suspended owing to the employee’s transfer to employer
B. The Court held that the habitual place of work under the second contract of employment was
relevant provided that employer A had an interest in the employee’s work for employer B.
74 (n 31). 75 ibid paras 20–23.
76 ibid para 24. 77 ibid para 25.
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The facts of Rutten v Cross Medical Ltd78 were strikingly similar.79
Mr Rutten, a commercial representative of Dutch nationality and domicile,
commenced proceedings in the Netherlands against Cross Medical, his
English employer. Mr Rutten performed some two-thirds of his work in the
Netherlands, the rest being divided between the United Kingdom, Belgium,
Germany and the United States. The work was carried out from an oﬃce
established in Mr Rutten’s home. The ECJ had an easy task: after referring to
the Mulox case,80 it held, in line therewith, that the habitual place of work was
‘the place where the employee has established the eﬀective centre of his
working activities and where, or from which, he in fact performs the essential
part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer’.81 The most important factors in
identifying this place were the fact that Mr Rutten carried out two-thirds of his
work in the Netherlands and that he had an oﬃce there.82
Mulox and Rutten clarify that the most important factors for determining the
habitual place of work are the location of the employee’s oﬃce and the
distribution of the working time among various countries. Since the ‘oﬃce’
and ‘time’ factors coincided in these two cases (ie the employees had their
oﬃces in the countries where they spent most of their working time), the ECJ
had no problem in identifying the habitual place of work. However, which of
the two factors is to be given greater weight if they do not coincide?
This question was discussed before the ECJ. Advocate General Jacobs, who
delivered Opinions in both Mulox and Rutten, argued that the main purpose of
the rule of jurisdiction in employment matters (conferring jurisdiction upon the
court with a particularly close connection with the dispute) was best satisﬁed if
the ‘oﬃce factor’ was given preference.83 In his view, this was because the
existence of an oﬃce in a place where the work was performed indicated that
that place of work was more important than the others. In other words,
Advocate General Jacobs equated the term ‘habitual place of work’ with
‘principal place of work’.84 The European Commission, on the other hand,
argued that preference should be given to the ‘time factor’.85 It indicated that
the term ‘habitual’ referred to the temporal organisation of work, and that it
could not be equated with the term ‘principal’, which referred to the central
78 (n 53).
79 The reference for preliminary ruling was made because Mulox was decided under the
original 1968 version of the Brussels Convention, which did not contain a special rule of
jurisdiction for employment disputes. Rutten had to be decided under the 1989 version of the
Convention, which did contain such a rule. The referring court was not sure whether the
introduction of the special rule meant a change in the law.
80 Rutten (n 53) paras 12–19. 81 ibid para 23.
82 ibid para 25.
83 Mulox (n 31), Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras 29, 33; Rutten (n 53), Opinion of AG Jacobs,
para 34.
84 Mulox (n 31), Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 32; Rutten (n 53), Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 25.
Compare P Mankowski, ‘Der gewöhnliche Arbeitsort im Internationalen Privat- und Prozeßrecht’,
(1999) 19 Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 332.
85 For the Commission’s view see Rutten (n 53), Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 33.
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point of work. It suggested that jurisdiction should be given to the courts of the
country where ‘a clear majority of days was spent’.86
Although the ECJ refrained from addressing this issue directly, it did
indirectly express its preference for the Advocate General’s approach. As
previously noted, Mr Geels’s activities in Mulox did not cover France until 14
months into his employment, and then did so for approximately 5 months.
Nevertheless, the ECJ failed to compare the amount of time Mr Geels had
spent in various countries. It did, however, refer to the ‘place where or from
which the employee principally discharges his obligations towards his
employer’87 and then mentioned the location of the oﬃce, but not the
distribution of the working time, as the relevant factor for determining this
place.88 Furthermore, in Rutten the ECJ referred to ‘the place where the
employee has established the eﬀective centre of his working activities and
where, or from which, he in fact performs the essential part of his duties
vis-à-vis his employer’.89 If an employee has an oﬃce, the eﬀective centre of
his or her working activities will rarely be somewhere else. The existence of an
oﬃce in a country therefore creates a strong presumption that the habitual place
of work is in that country.90 This presumption is rebuttable only in exceptional
cases where the other relevant factors (eg the subject matter of the dispute;
the amount, value, nature and importance of work performed in another
country; the employee’s domicile or residence in another country) establish a
particularly strong connection with the courts of another country.
Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd91 concerned an employee who did
not have an oﬃce that could constitute the eﬀective centre of his working
activities. Mr Weber, a German national domiciled in Germany, was employed
by Universal Ogden Services, a Scottish company, as a cook. He carried out
his work on board various vessels and sea installations, initially in the
Netherlands, and thereafter in Denmark. The ECJ held that, in this situation,
which involved a change of the place of work, the habitual place of work ‘is, in
principle, the place where [the employee] spends most of his working time’.92
This place is to be determined by looking at the whole period of employment.
Since Mr Weber spent the majority of his working time in the Netherlands, the
Dutch courts had jurisdiction.
The ECJ acknowledged that the sole application of the quantitative,
temporal criterion in this type of case might point to a court that did not have
a particularly close connection with the dispute. That is why it stated that the
86 ibid.
87 Mulox (n 31) para 24 (emphasis added). See also Jan Voogsgeerd (n 53) para 33.
88 ibid para 25. 89 Rutten (n 53) para 23 (emphasis added).
90 SeeMulox (n 31), Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 33; Rutten (n 53), Opinion of AG Jacobs, para
34. See also Pitzolu v Banca Gesﬁd SA [2009] ILPr 27 (Italian Corte di cassazione, 9 January
2008). 91 (n 53).
92 ibid paras 50–52 (emphasis added). See also Re Employment in More Than One State (5
AZR 141/01) [2003] ILPr 33 (German Bundesarbeitsgericht, 29 May 2002).
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place where the majority of work was carried out was ‘in principle’ the habitual
place of work.93 All the circumstances of the case should be taken into account
in order to ascertain whether there is some other place with a stronger
connection.94 In particular, the intention of the parties should be considered.
The fact that the parties intended to shift the place of work permanently from
one place to another might indicate that the former had ceased, and the latter
had become, the habitual place of work, irrespective of the fact that overall the
majority of work was performed in the former place.95
The importance of the intention of the parties should not, however, be
limited to the Weber type of case. It is potentially relevant whenever an
employee (irrespective of whether his or her work is performed from an oﬃce
or not) is sent abroad by the employer, either to an employer’s foreign place of
business, branch, subsidiary or aﬃliate, or to another company under a
cooperation agreement or a contract of ‘hiring-out of employees’. It the parties
intend the posting to be temporary (ie limited to the completion of a certain
project or to a certain period of time) this supports the conclusion that there is
no change in the habitual place of work. If the parties intend the posting to be
permanent that supports a diﬀerent conclusion.96
In conclusion, the ECJ has interpreted the term ‘habitual place of work’
narrowly in certain respects but widely in others. The term is given narrow
interpretation in the sense that there cannot be more than one habitual place of
work. This is considered necessary for avoiding the multiplication of courts
having jurisdiction.97 The term ‘habitual place of work’ is thus eﬀectively
equated to ‘principal place of work’. The term is interpreted widely in that the
determination of the habitual place of work is essentially a search for the place
that is most closely connected with the employment dispute.98 The ‘oﬃce’ and
‘time’ factors create presumptions that the habitual place of work is the place
where the oﬃce is located or, in the absence thereof, where the employee
spends most of his or her working time. If another place of work is, in the light
of all relevant objective and subjective factors, more closely connected, the
presumption will be rebutted in favour of that place.99 The following text will
compare the rule of the habitual place of work with the rule of jurisdiction in
matters relating to a contract for services.
93 ibid para 50. 94 ibid paras 53, 58. 95 ibid para 54.
96 For the importance of the intention of the parties see Mankowski (n 84) 334–35; P
Mankowski, ‘Europäisches Internationales Arbeitsprozessrecht: Weiteres zum gewöhnlichen
Arbeitsort’ (2003) 13 IPRax 21, 23–25; see also Four Winds Charter (Societe) v Latoja [2009]
ILPr 50 (French Cour de cassation, 31 March 2009). See also para 36 in the Preamble to Rome I.
97 Mulox (n 31) paras 21, 23; Rutten (n 53) para 18;Weber (n 53) paras 42, 55; Pugliese (n 53)
para 22.
98 Mulox (n 31) para 17; Rutten (n 53) para 16; Weber (n 53) para 39; Pugliese (n 53) para 17.
See also Ivenel (n 25) paras 14–15.
99 Mulox (n 31) para 25; Weber (n 53) para 58; Mulox (n 31), Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 33;
Rutten (n 53) Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 34; Weber (n 53), Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras 49–50.
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2. Place of provision of services
Article 5(1)(a) of Brussels I lays down the general rule of jurisdiction in
contractual matters. It prescribes that, in matters relating to a contract, the
courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question shall have
jurisdiction. The ‘obligation in question’ is the obligation forming the basis of
the claim;100 the ‘place of performance’ is to be determined by reference to the
law applicable under the choice-of-law rules of the forum.101
With regard to contracts for services, the second indent of article 5(1)(b)
contains an exception to the general rule. It prescribes that ‘unless otherwise
agreed, the place of performance of the obligation in question shall be . . . the
place in a Member State where, under the contract, the services were provided
or should have been provided’.102 Therefore, even if the actual claim under a
contract for services concerns non-payment, the jurisdictionally relevant
obligation is ordinarily the obligation to provide services. Furthermore, the
place of provision of services is ordinarily deﬁned autonomously, and is to be
determined by reference to the provisions of the contract and the facts of the
case, not the applicable law.103 In this respect, the rule of jurisdiction in matters
relating to a contract for services largely corresponds to the primary rule of
jurisdiction in employment matters. However, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the two rules.
First, the jurisdictionally relevant obligation with regard to employment
contracts is always the obligation to perform work, and the term ‘habitual place
of work’ is always deﬁned autonomously. In contrast, the parties to a contract
for services may agree that the exception contained in the second indent of
article 5(1)(b) does not apply. In other words, they may agree that the
jurisdictionally relevant obligation is the obligation forming the basis of the
claim, whose place of performance is to be determined by reference to the law
applicable under the choice-of-law rules of the forum. This agreement need not
satisfy the general requirements concerning jurisdiction agreements laid down
in article 23.104 Thus, if A contracts with B to provide services in one Member
State in return for payment in another Member State, the courts of the ﬁrst
Member State shall normally have jurisdiction over the whole dispute.
However, if the parties agree that the exception contained in the second indent
of article 5(1)(b) does not apply, the courts of the second Member State
shall have jurisdiction over claims for non-payment pursuant to the general
rule of article 5(1)(a). In contrast, the rule of the habitual place of work
100 De Bloos (n 26).
101 Tessili (n 27). The corresponding art 5(1) of the Brussels and 1988 Lugano Conventions is
identical to art 5(1)(a) of Brussels I.
102 Brussels I, art 5(1)(b), second indent (emphasis added).
103 See Case C–381/08 Car Trim GmbH v KeySafety Systems Srl [2010] ECR I–1255, paras
53–57; Case C–87/10 Electrosteel Europe SA v Edil Centro SpA not yet published in ECR.
104 See T Hartley, International Commercial Litigation: Text, Cases and Materials on Private
International Law (CUP 2009) 48.
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does not enable an employee to sue his or her employer for non-payment of
salary in a Member State other than that where the work was habitually
performed. Therefore, the primary rule of jurisdiction in employment matters is
narrower in this respect than the rule in matters relating to a contract for
services.
The second diﬀerence stems from the fact that the exception contained in the
second indent of article 5(1)(b) does not apply where the services were
provided or should have been provided outside the EU. In that situation, a
‘place in a Member State where . . . the services were provided or should have
been provided’ does not exist, and one of the requirements for the application
of the second indent of article 5(1)(b) is not met. The general rule of article 5(1)
(a) then regains its applicability.105 Thus, if A contracts with B to provide
services in a non-Member State in return for payment in a Member State, the
mentioned exception does not apply. A may rely on the general rule, and sue B
for non-payment in the Member State in which the payment should have been
performed. In contrast, if the work under an employment contract is habitually
performed outside the EU, the rule of the habitual place of work does not
enable an employee to sue his or her employer for unpaid salary in the Member
State in which the salary should have been paid. This is another situation in
which the primary rule of jurisdiction in employment matters is narrower than
the rule in matters relating to a contract for services.
With regard to the determination of the place of provision of services for the
purposes of the second indent of article 5(1)(b), there is no problem if the
services were provided or should have been provided in one place. The courts
for that place shall have jurisdiction. As with employment contracts, the
problem arises where the services were provided or should have been provided
in more than one place. The ECJ has dealt with this in Rehder v Air Baltic
Corporation106 and Wood Floor.107
These two cases concerned the determination of the place of provision of
services where there were several places of performance in diﬀerent Member
States. The ECJ held that, in such cases, it was necessary to identify the court
with the closest connection with the dispute, which it said was the court for ‘the
place where, pursuant to the contract, the main provision of services is to be
carried out’.108 Thus, with regard to commercial agency contracts, the relevant
place is to be determined ﬁrst by reference to the provisions of the contract.109
105 Brussels I, art 5(1)(c); C–19/09 Wood Floor Solutions Andreas Domberger GmbH v Silva
Trade SA [2010] ECR I–2121, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para 86; compare K Takahashi,
‘Jurisdiction in Matters Relating to Contract: Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention and
Regulation’ (2002) 27 ELRev 530, 540.
106 Case C–204/08, [2009] ECR I–06073.
107 (n 105). For a general discussion of this problem see U Grušic´, ‘Jurisdiction in Complex
Contracts under the Brussels I Regulation’ (2011) 7 J Priv Intl L 321.
108 Rehder (n 106) paras 37–38; Wood Floor (n 105) para 33.
109 Wood Floor (n 105) paras 38–39. See also P Mankowski, ‘Commercial Agents under
European Jurisdiction Rules’ (2008) 10 Yb Priv Intl L 19, 31–42.
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In the words of the ECJ, the search is for ‘the place where the agent was to
carry out his work on behalf of the principal, consisting in particular in
preparing, negotiating and, where appropriate, concluding the transactions for
which he has authority’.110 A commercial agent normally performs these
activities in his or her oﬃce. If the contract does not enable the determination
of the place of the main provision of services (eg because several places or
none were speciﬁed), and if the agent has already provided services in
accordance with the contract, account should be taken of the place where the
agent has in fact for the most part carried out his or her activities in
performance of the contract.111 The relevant factors, such as the time spent and
the importance of the activities carried out in various places, will also normally
point to the agent’s oﬃce. If the two above mentioned criteria are not helpful,
the place where the agent is domiciled (again ordinarily the place where his or
her oﬃce is located) will be deemed to be the relevant place.112 Sometimes,
however, the place of the main provision of services cannot be determined. For
example, the relevant services in the case of passenger air transport are, by their
very nature, performed in an indivisible and identical manner from the place of
departure to that of arrival of the aircraft. One place of the main provision of
services does not therefore exist.113 In such cases, jurisdiction is conferred
upon the courts for each place of provision of services.114
3. Habitual place of work versus place of provision of services: conclusion
The criteria for determining the habitual place of work and the place of
provision of services for the purposes of the rules of jurisdiction of Brussels I
are inherently the same. As discussed, the habitual place of work is interpreted
as the principal place of work, and the place of provision of services as the
place of the main provision of services. In both situations, the purpose of
determining these places is to confer jurisdiction upon the court most closely
connected with the dispute. The fact that the search for the habitual place of
work is facilitated by the existence of presumptions created by the ‘oﬃce’ and
‘time’ factors reﬂects the relatively speciﬁc nature of the rule of jurisdiction for
employment contracts. The more general nature of the rule of jurisdiction in
matters relating to a contract for services (which covers a range of widely
distinct contracts) does not allow an a priori elevation of one or more factors to
the status of presumptions. However, with regard to commercial agency
contracts, which are akin to international employment contracts entered into by
110 Wood Floor (n 105) para 38. 111 ibid para 40.
112 ibid para 42. 113 Rehder (n 106) para 42.
114 ibid paras 44–45, 47. If the services consist in a negative obligation that is not subject to any
geographical limits, there is no jurisdictionally relevant place of provision of services: Case C–256/
00 Besix SA v Wasserreinigungsbau Alfred Kretzschmar GmbH & Co KG (WABAG) [2002] ECR
I–1699 (the parties undertook to act exclusively and not to commit themselves to other parties
anywhere in the world).
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commercial representatives, the location of the agent’s oﬃce weighs more than
other factors. This supports the conclusion that the criteria for determining the
two places are inherently the same.
Therefore, the primary rule of jurisdiction in employment matters and the
rule of jurisdiction in matters relating to a contract for services correspond
closely. However, there are three diﬀerences between the two rules. First, the
relevant obligation for establishing jurisdiction over an employment dispute is
always the obligation to perform work, and the term ‘habitual place of work’ is
always deﬁned autonomously. In contrast, the parties to a contract for services
may agree that the exception contained in the second indent of article 5(1)(b)
does not apply. If they do so agree, the general rule of article 5(1)(a) allows the
service provider to bring the claim for non-payment in the place where the
payment should have been performed. Secondly, the fact that the place of
payment of salary is in a Member State is always irrelevant for jurisdictional
purposes. In contrast, if the services were provided or should have been
provided outside the EU, the exception contained in the second indent of
article 5(1)(b) does not apply. If the place of payment happens to be in the EU,
the general rule of article 5(1)(a) then allows the service provider to bring the
claim for non-payment at that place. Thirdly, if the habitual place of work
cannot be determined, the fallback rule of the engaging place of business
applies. In contrast, if the place of the main provision of services cannot be
identiﬁed, the service provider may sue the other party in the courts for each
place of provision of services.
Do the diﬀerences between these two rules result in claimant employees
being in a better or worse jurisdictional position than claimant service
providers? The ﬁrst diﬀerence may open an additional forum to service
providers. However, this depends on the agreement of the parties. Since the
parties to an employment contract may also agree to expand the number of
forums available to the employee, the ﬁrst diﬀerence has no practical
importance apart from the fact that a jurisdiction agreement must satisfy the
general requirements of article 23, while an agreement on not applying the
exception contained in the second indent of article 5(1)(b) need not. The
second and third diﬀerences are of practical importance. They open additional
forums to service providers but not to employees in comparable situations. The
primary rule of jurisdiction in employment contracts is therefore slightly less
favourable for claimant employees than the generally applicable rule of
jurisdiction in matters relating to a contract for services is for claimant service
providers.
C. Engaging Place of Business
An employee who does not or did not habitually carry out his or her work in
any one country may commence proceedings against the employer domiciled
in one Member State in another Member State where the business that engaged
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him or her is or was situated.115 No corresponding basis of jurisdiction is
available to other claimants. As discussed, if the place of the main provision of
services cannot be determined, a party to a services contract may bring
proceedings in the courts for each place of provision of services.
The recent ECJ judgment in Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA116 sheds light on
the meaning of the concept of the engaging place of business. Although this
decision concerned the interpretation of article 6(2)(b) of the Rome
Convention, it is nevertheless relevent for the present discussion, since the
concepts used in the European private international law instruments must be
interpreted consistently.117 ‘Place of business’ refers not only to the employ-
er’s domicile but also to any entity, including a branch, agency or other
establishment with no legal personality, that possesses a suﬃcient degree of
permanence, and over which the employer exercises eﬀective control so that its
acts are attributable to the employer.118 Some authors argue that ‘place of
business’ also refers to independent employment agencies.119 However, the
fact that the jurisdiction is given to the courts for both the place where the
engaging place of business is located at the moment of commencement of
proceedings and for the place where it was located at the moment of
engagement120 goes against such a broad interpretation. An employer cannot
be exposed to litigation in foreign countries just because an employment
agency, which might have been used a long time ago, is transferred from one
Member State to another. ‘Place of business’ therefore seems to encompass the
employer’s domicile and ‘branch agency and other establishment’ in the
meaning of article 5(5) of Brussels I.121 The term ‘engaged’ refers to active
115 Brussels I, art 19(2)(b). The wording of the Brussels Convention is slightly diﬀerent. It states
that an employee who ‘does not habitually carry out his work in any one country . . . may also [sue
his employer in the courts of the engaging place of business]’ (emphasis added). The use of the
word ‘also’ led some authors to a wrong conclusion that the courts of the engaging place of
business were available alongside the courts for the habitual place of work: see AE Anton and PR
Beaumont, Private International Law: A Treatise from the Standpoint of Scots Law (2nd ed, Green
1990) 183, fn 29; A Briggs, ‘Mulox v Geels’ (1993) 13 YbEurL 520, 523–24; H Tagaras, ‘Mulox v
Geels’ [1995] Cahiers de droit européen 188, 190.
116 (n 53).
117 ibid Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para 83. See also Koelzsch (n 53) para 33.
118 Jan Voogsgeerd (n 53) paras 54–57; ibid Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras 78–81. See also
Jenard–Möler Report (n 34) para 43.
119 See CE Mota and GP Moreno, ‘Section 5: Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of
Employment’ in Magnus and Mankowski (eds) (n 58) 326, 339.
120 This results from the wording ‘where the business which engaged the employee is or was
situated’. A problem of interpretation might arise if the relevant business moves from country A
(where the employee was engaged) to country B and then to country C (where it is situated at the
moment of commencement of proceedings). Can the employee then sue the employer in
country B? The wording of art 19(2)(b) of Brussels I is wide enough to support this conclusion.
However, this should not be allowed, as the courts of country B would more often than not have no
connection with the dispute. See R Kidner, ‘Jurisdiction in European Contracts of Employment’
(1998) 27 Industrial Law Journal 103, 112.
121 See Jan Voogsgeerd (n 53), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para 83. See also Cruz-Real-Jenard
Report (n 37) para 23(c), fn 1.
Jurisdiction in Employment Matters Under Brussels I 113
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 20 Sep 2013 IP address: 128.243.253.103
engagement of employees, which is manifested by the conclusion and
negotiation of the employment contract.122
The rule of the engaging place of business is applicable where an
employee does not or did not habitually carry out his or her work in any
one country.123 Given that the ECJ has widely interpreted the term ‘habitual
place of work’, equating it to ‘principal place of work’, there are not many
situations in which the rule of the engaging place of business will be
applicable. It is of practical importance primarily where the employee’s work is
not carried out from an oﬃce, and where the working time spent in various
countries does not establish a habitual place of work in any of those countries.
The rule of the engaging place of business is also applicable where an
employee works in two or more places of equal importance. It is possible to
imagine an employee who works, for example, in France and Italy, maintains
oﬃces in both countries, and spends roughly the same amount of time in each
oﬃce performing the same type of work. Another example is an employee
who has no oﬃce and divides his or her working time equally among several
places performing the same type of work. Such situations, however, are
extremely rare.
The work performed by employees engaged in international transport seems
to fall under the rule of the engaging place of business. Indeed, two
jurisdictional cases involving work of this kind have already been referred to
the ECJ.Warbecq v Ryanair Ltd124 concerned a dispute between an air hostess
of Belgian nationality and domicile and an Irish airline. The referring court (the
Tribunal du travail de Charleroi) wanted to know whether a habitual place
of work existed where the work was performed partly on the ground and
partly on an aircraft ﬂying the ﬂag of the employer’s country. Another case,
Haase v Superfast Ferries SA,125 concerned a dispute brought by a seaman
who worked on a ship that was used for regular passenger services between
Germany and Finland. The referring court (the Landesarbeitsgericht
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) again wanted to know if there was a habitual
place of work in such a situation.
Since the references in these two cases had not been made by the authorized
courts, the ECJ had no jurisdiction to render preliminary rulings.126 Although
122 ibid paras 45–50; ibid Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras 65–70.
123 This rule is not applicable where there is a habitual place of work outside the EU: see n 72. It
is also not applicable where the whole of the employee’s work is carried out in a single Member
State, but not habitually in any one place within that Member State. By analogy with Case C–386/
05 Color Drack GmbH v Lexx International Vertriebs GmbH [2007] ECR I–3699, the court for
each place of work would have jurisdiction over the whole employment dispute; see also Jenard–
Möler Report (n 34) para 39.
124 (n 53). 125 ibid.
126 Pursuant to the then extant version of art 68(1) of the EC Treaty, only a court or a tribunal of
a Member State against whose decisions there was no judicial remedy under national law could
make references for preliminary ruling to the ECJ regarding the interpretation of the provisions of
Brussels I. The Tribunal du travail de Charleroi and the Landesarbeitsgericht Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern did not meet these criteria.
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the employees in these two cases did not have oﬃces, they seem to have had
eﬀective centres of their working activities. In the ﬁrst case, this was arguably
Charleroi airport, at which Ms Warbeck performed her ground duties and to
which she returned after each ﬂight. A passenger may sue the airline both at the
place of departure and the place of arrival of the aircraft.127 Proper performance
of work by the air crew members at those two places is therefore essential for
the proper performance by the airline of its contracts of passenger air transport.
Given that an air crew member typically works on aircrafts ﬂying from one
airport (ie one place of departure) to various destinations (ie various places
of arrival), the essential part of such an employee’s working activities is
performed at the place of departure. In the second case, the eﬀective centre of
the employee’s working activities was arguably the place in Germany from
which the ferry was departing to Finland and to which the employee returned
after each trip. Admittedly, the employee in Superfast Ferriesworked on a ship
connecting only two places in two diﬀerent countries, and it cannot be said that
the provision of services in one of those places was more important. However,
the facts that the employee’s activities were directed from the place in
Germany, that the employee had his domicile there and that the ship seems to
have had its home port there, point to that place as the eﬀective centre of the
employee’s working activities. If the ECJ were to adopt such a wide inter-
pretation,128 the practical relevance of the rule of the engaging place of
business would be limited to cases where the connections between the vessel
and its base were very weak (eg cases involving seamen working on ocean
liners, cruise ships or cargo ships).
A reason why the ECJ has interpreted the term ‘habitual place of work’
widely, and thereby marginalized the rule of the engaging place of business,
is that this rule does not meet the objectives of proximity and employee
protection. First, there is no guarantee that the courts of the engaging place of
business will have a suﬃciently close connection with the dispute. Suppose an
English company were to use its Belgian business to engage European
employees for work on a cruise ship. If a dispute arose some time after the
engagement, the likelihood that the Belgian courts would have a close
connection with the dispute would be low, particularly if the employee had no
other connection with Belgium. The likelihood would be even lower if the
business that engaged the employee were transferred from one country to
another (eg from Belgium to France). The employee might then commence
proceedings either at the place where the business that engaged him or her was
situated at the moment of engagement (Belgium) or at the place where that
business was situated at the moment of commencement of proceedings
127 Rehder (n 106).
128 See Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA (n 53) paras 31–41; ibid, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras
56–60; compare the decision of the Tribunal du travail de Charleroi of 6 September 2007 in the
Warbecq case <www.juridat.be> . The Belgian court held that Ms Warbecq had not habitually
worked in any one country, and consequently applied the rule of the engaging place of business.
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(France). The courts for neither place would be particularly likely to have a
close connection with the dispute.129 Secondly, the engaging place of business
is determined unilaterally by the employer and usually corresponds with the
employer’s domicile. That is why this rule is not in employees’ interests.
In summary, by interpreting widely the term ‘habitual place of work’ the
ECJ reduced the application of the rule of the engaging place of business to a
few situations of relatively marginal importance. Even when it is applicable,
this rule results in the concentration of the entire employment dispute in the
courts of the engaging place of business.130 This is clearly less favourable for
employees’ interests than the multiplication of competent courts to which the
rule of jurisdiction in matters relating to a contract for services leads in
comparable situations (ie where the place of the main provision of services
does not exist).
D. Branches, Agencies and Other Establishments
An employee may sue an employer domiciled in one Member State, regarding
a dispute arising out of the operations of that employer’s branch, agency or
other establishment, in another Member State in the courts for the place where
that ancillary establishment is situated.131 Claimant employees are in the same
position as other claimants in this regard since this basis of jurisdiction is
equally available to both categories.
The requirement that the dispute must arise out of the operations of an
ancillary establishment will be discussed here in more detail.132 Initially, the
ECJ interpreted this requirement rather strictly. It held that the concept of
‘operations’ comprised three types of actions:
. actions concerning the management of the ancillary establishment ‘such
as . . . the local engagement of staﬀ to work [at the place where the
establishment was situated]’;
. actions relating to contractual obligations entered into in the name of the
parent company at the place, and to be performed in the country where the
establishment was situated;
. actions relating to non-contractual obligations arising out of the local
activities of the ancillary establishment.133
It is remarkable that the courts for the place where the ancillary establishment
was situated would have had jurisdiction in these three situations on other
129 See Mulox (n 31), Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 37; Rutten (n 53), Opinion of AG Jacobs,
para 37. 130 See Jenard–Möler Report (n 34) para 40.
131 Brussels I, arts 5(5) and 18(1).
132 For the requirement that a defendant domiciled in a Member State must have an ancillary
establishment in another Member State see L Collins (gen ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the
Conﬂict of Laws (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) paras 11–310, 11–311; JJ Fawcett and JM
Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (14th edn, OUP 2008) 258–60.
133 Case 33/78 Somafer SA v Saar-Ferngas AG [1978] ECR 2183, para 13.
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bases as well.134 It is therefore not surprising that the ECJ has subsequently
given a wider interpretation to this requirement. With regard to the second type
of action in particular, the Court held in Lloyd’s Register of Shipping v
Campenon Bernard135 that it was not necessary for the contractual obligations
entered into by the ancillary establishment to be performed in the Member
State in which the establishment was situated. In order for a contractual claim
to be regarded as arising out of the operations of the ancillary establishment, it
is enough that the contract was either concluded or negotiated136 through that
establishment.
Such a wide interpretation means that, whenever an employer’s ancillary
establishment concludes or negotiates an employment contract on behalf of its
parent, the employee may sue the employer under the contract in the courts for
the place where that establishment is located, regardless of where the work is in
fact performed. This also means that the rule of jurisdiction over defendants
dealing though branches, agencies or other establishment covers almost all
situations in which the rule of the engaging place of business is applicable. The
diﬀerence between the two rules is that the former is always applicable,
whereas the latter is applicable only if there is no habitual place of work. The
rule of the engaging place of business is therefore of practical importance only
in rare situations where the place of business that engaged the employee is
transferred from one place to another after the engagement. The employee may
sue his or her employer at either place under the rules of the engaging place of
business. An equivalent option does not exist under articles 2 and 5(5) of
Brussels I.137
E. Other Bases of Jurisdiction
The ECJ has held that claimant employees cannot invoke the basis of
jurisdiction over co-defendants (article 6(1)), which basis is generally available
to other claimants.138 The reasoning of the ECJ extends to all other bases that
are neither contained in Section 5 of Chapter II of Brussels I nor referred to
therein. The only exception is submission to jurisdiction by entering an
appearance.139 Special rules of jurisdiction therefore put claimant employees in
a less favourable position in this respect.
134 Brussels Convention, arts 5(1) and 5(3); Brussels I, arts 5(1), 5(3), 19.
135 Case C-439/93, [1995] ECR I–961.
136 See Case 218/86 SAR Schotte GmbH v Parfums Rotschild SARL [1987] ECR 4905, Opinion
of AG Slynn; Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (n 135) para 20; Anton Durbeck GmbH v Den Norske
Bank Asa [2003] QB 1160 (CA) para 40.
137 A Briggs and P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (5th edn, Informa 2009) 282–83. See
also K Hertz, Jurisdiction in Contract and Torts under the Brussels Convention (Jurist og
Ø´konomforbundets Forlag 1998) 183. 138 See above, 2.
139 See n 52. The situation is diﬀerent under the Brussels and 1988 Lugano Conventions: see
n 12.
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F. Jurisdiction Agreements
Claimant employees are given a signiﬁcant jurisdictional preference with
regard to jurisdiction agreements. A jurisdiction agreement is given eﬀect in an
employment dispute either if it is entered into after the dispute has arisen or if it
allows the employee to bring proceedings in the courts other than those indi-
cated by the default rules of jurisdiction, provided that the general requirements
of article 23 are also satisﬁed.140 Suppose an employee habitually works in
England for a French company. If the parties agree ex ante on the jurisdiction
of the Belgian courts, such an agreement will be eﬀective only if the employee
invokes it. Any provision of national law that aims to make such an agreement
void141 does not apply.142 In contrast, in disputes that do not involve a weaker
contractual party, jurisdiction agreements are given full eﬀect provided that
they satisfy the requirements laid down in article 23 of Brussels I.
G. Conclusion
In certain respects, the rules of jurisdiction in employment matters of Brussels I
give claimant employees a jurisdictional preference. Most notably, juris-
diction agreements are given eﬀect against employees under very strict con-
ditions. This guarantees that employers will not be able to abuse their typically
superior bargaining power and reduce the number of forums available to
employees. This is undoubtedly a very important aspect of jurisdictional
protection.
However, the crucial aspect of protection is the existence of the relatively
numerous and diverse bases of jurisdiction that claimant employees can
invoke. Only thereby are the chances of employees pursuing their claims in
favourable forums increased and safeguarded. Brussels I fails in this respect.
First, the rule of general jurisdiction and the primary rule of jurisdiction in
employment matters are somewhat less favourable for employees than the
generally applicable rule of general jurisdiction and the rule of jurisdiction in
matters relating to a contract for services. Secondly, the fallback rule of the
engaging place of business is deprived of almost any practical importance.
Thirdly, the generally available bases of jurisdiction that are neither contained
in Section 5 of Chapter II of the Regulation nor referred to therein are not
available to claimant employees. The examination of the rules of jurisdiction in
employment matters therefore reveals that claimant employees are overall not
given a jurisdictional preference. In many respects they are even put in a less
favourable position than other claimants. Given the theoretical and practical
140 Brussels I, art 21; Schlosser Report (n 48) para 161.
141 eg British Employment Rights Act 1996, s 203.
142 Sanicentral (n 21); Elefanten Schuh (n 21). Compare A Layton and H Mercer (eds),
European Civil Practice (Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 620.
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importance of according a jurisdictional preference to claimant employees,
Brussels I fails to achieve the objective of employee protection.
V. RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS
As discussed, the reason for the current structure and content of the rules of
jurisdiction in employment matters of Brussels I lies in their haphazard
evolution. If this instrument is really to achieve the objective of employee
protection, the existing rules need to be amended in a more systematic manner.
The ﬁrst part of this section explores ways of improving the existing rules. The
second part examines the possibility of introducing new rules that would
enhance the protection of employees.
A. Improving the Existing Jurisdictional Rules
The shortcoming of the rule of general jurisdiction is that the rule extending the
notion of the employer’s domicile often disfavours claimant employees.
Admittedly, this rule does guarantee that employees will be able to sue non-EU
employers with European ancillary establishments, regarding disputes arising
out of the operations of those establishments, in at least one Member State.
However, the rule also shields such non-EU employers from the Member
States’ traditional, often excessive, rules of jurisdiction. There is no reason why
this kind of jurisdictional protection should be accorded to non-EU employers
with EU ancillary establishments. Rather, such non-EU employers should be
treated as all other non-EU defendants, and be amenable to suit in the Member
States’ courts pursuant to the traditional rules of jurisdiction. Article 18(2) of
Brussels I should therefore be amended by inserting a provision explicitly
stating that the rule extending the notion of the employer’s domicile applies
without prejudice to article 4. The European Commission, however, plans to
abolish the traditional jurisdictional rules completely through the extension of
the scope of the existing jurisdictional rules of Brussels I to third States’
domiciliaries.143
The primary rule of jurisdiction in employment matters (conferring
jurisdiction upon the courts for the habitual place of work) could be amended
to reﬂect the fact that the ECJ has eﬀectively equated the term ‘habitual place of
work’ with ‘principal place of work’. The ECJ’s interpretation has already
been implemented in Rome I.144 Article 8(2) of this Regulation, dealing with
the applicable law for employment contracts in the absence of choice, refers to
the ‘country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually
143 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction’ (n 14) 9.
144 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on
the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I)’, COM (2005) 650 ﬁnal, 7.
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carries out his work in performance of the contract’.145 Arguably, the essence
of the ECJ’s interpretation could have been better expressed if the reference to
the place ‘in which or from which the employee principally carries out his
work’ had been made instead. Nevertheless, in order to achieve the desirable
convergence between the two instruments, it is better to amend article 19(2)(a)
of Brussels I along the lines of article 8(2) of Rome I. Indeed, the European
Commission has proposed the following wording for the recast Brussels I: ‘an
employer may be sued . . . in the courts for the place where or from where the
employee habitually carries out his work or in the courts for the last place
where he did so’.146
As discussed, there are two diﬀerences between the primary rule of
jurisdiction in employment matters and the rule of jurisdiction in matters
relating to a contract for services, which result in a somewhat less favourable
position of claimant employees in comparison to other claimants. The ﬁrst
diﬀerence stems from the fact that the obligation of payment of salary is always
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes. In contrast, where the place of provision
of services is outside the EU, the obligation to pay remuneration in a Member
State represents a basis of jurisdiction of that Member State’s courts over the
claim for non-payment. Should the rules of jurisdiction in employment matters
be amended to enable claimant employees to bring claims for non-payment of
salary in the courts for the place of payment if the habitual place of work is
outside the EU?147 Although such a rule would contribute to equating the
jurisdictional position of claimant employees and other claimants, the answer
must be negative. Such a rule would not accord with the considerations of
proportionality and vindication of important State interests. The chances of the
place of payment of salary being suﬃciently connected with the dispute and
the law of that place being applicable where there is a habitual place of work in
another country are low. Moreover, this rule would not be particularly
protective of employees’ interests. An employer might unilaterally determine
the place of payment of salary and thereby seek the beneﬁt of litigating in a
favourable forum.
The second relevant diﬀerence between the two rules is that, in the absence
of a habitual place of work, an employee can commence proceedings only in
the courts of the engaging place of business. In a comparable situation, a
service provider may sue the other party in the courts for each place of
provision of services. In order to equate the position of claimant employees
and other claimants in this respect, the forum of the engaging place of
business should be abandoned. If this were done, an employee who does not
145 Art 8(2) of Rome I also prescribes that the ‘country where the work is habitually carried out
shall not be deemed to have changed if [the employee] is temporarily employed in another
country’. See also recital 36 in the Preamble to this Regulation.
146 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction’ (n 14) 32.
147 Six Constructions (n 53), Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras 14–15.
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habitually perform his or her work in any one country should be able to
commence proceedings in the courts for each place of work, provided that
there is a suﬃcient connection between that place and the dispute. Thus, if
there is no habitual place of work because two or more places of work are
equally important,148 the employee should be able to commence proceedings
in each of those places. However, if the habitual place of work does not exist
because no place of work in any country is suﬃciently connected with the
dispute,149 the employee should not be able to commence proceedings in any
place of work.
There are further reasons for abandoning the rule of the engaging place of
business. The ECJ has deprived this rule of almost any practical importance by
widely interpreting the term ‘habitual place of work’ and giving a broad scope
to the rule of jurisdiction over defendants dealing through branches, agencies
and other establishments. Moreover, the rule of the engaging place of business
does not accord with the consideration of proportionality and employee
protection. The chances of this place being suﬃciently connected with the
employment dispute are low; moreover it is a place that is determined
unilaterally by the employer. It is for these reasons that the Netherlands and
Belgium, which have otherwise implemented the solutions of Brussels I in
their national jurisdictional codes, have decided not to introduce the rule of the
engaging place of business.150
Seemingly, this rule accords better with the consideration of vindication of
important State interests. Rome I prescribes that, in the absence of a habitual
place of work, the employment contract is presumed to be governed by the law
of the country where the place of business through which the employee was
engaged is situated.151 However, there are many situations in which the
habitual place of work is absent and the forum and ius do not coincide. First, if
the engaging business is transferred from one place to another after the
engagement, the employee may commence proceedings in the courts for either
place. In contrast, only the latter place seems relevant for the choice-of-law
purposes.152 Secondly, the rule of Rome I that points to the law of the country
of the engaging place of business can be departed from whenever it appears
from the circumstances as a whole that the employment contract is more
148 eg where an employee maintains oﬃces in several places of work and divides his or her
working time equally among these places performing the same type of work, or where an employee
who has no oﬃce divides his or working time equally among several places performing the same
type of work. See also Mulox (n 31), Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 35.
149 eg cases involving seamen working on ocean liners, cruise ships or cargo ships.
150 The Dutch reporter for the ‘Study on Residual Jurisdiction’ (n 68) explains that this rule ‘has
not been introduced into Dutch civil procedure because it was considered unnecessary’: General
Report <http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_resid_jurisd_netherlands_en.pdf> , 18.
151 Rome I, art 8(3).
152 Compare art 19(2)(b) of Brussels I, referring to ‘the place where the business which engaged
[the employee] is or was situated’, with art 8(3) of Rome I, referring to ‘the place of business
through which the employee was engaged is situated’.
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closely connected with another country.153 Since there are no guarantees that
the country of the engaging place of business will be suﬃciently connected
with the employment contract, the chances of departure from the rule are
relatively high. Thirdly, parties to an employment contract may, under certain
restriction, choose the applicable law.154
Finally, some of the bases of jurisdiction that are neither contained in
Section 5 of Chapter II of Brussels I nor referred to therein should be made
available to claimant employees. This applies primarily to the rule of
jurisdiction over co-defendants. Indeed, the European Commission has
proposed making this jurisdictional rule available to claimant employees.155
If the amendments proposed here were adopted, the rules of jurisdiction in
employment matters would cease to be less favourable for claimant employees
than the general rules. However, the special rules would not thereby become
more favourable. The following part of this section will explore the possibility
of introducing additional bases of jurisdiction.
B. Introducing New Jurisdictional Rules
Many countries have adopted special rules of jurisdiction for employment
disputes. A study on residual jurisdiction of the Member State courts
conducted in 2007 illustrates the multitude of existing approaches.156 Out of
27 Member States, only 7 do not have a jurisdictional rule of this kind.
Jurisdiction is asserted on various bases, such as the location of the habitual
place of work, the place of business that engaged the employee, the place of
conclusion of the contract, the place of payment of salary, common nationality
of the parties, and the employee’s domicile or habitual residence. The bases of
jurisdiction not contained in Brussels I will be examined in the light of
considerations of proportionality, vindication of important State interests and
employee protection.
The shortcomings of the place of contracting rule are too well known to be
repeated here. There are no guarantees that the country where an employment
contract was concluded will be suﬃciently connected with, or interested in
adjudicating, disputes arising out of it. Moreover, employers might easily
manipulate this connecting factor and thus seek the beneﬁt of litigating in the
forums favourable for them. The same concerns apply to the place of payment
of salary. Common nationality of the parties will frequently confer jurisdiction
on the courts of the country that is closely connected with, and interested in
adjudicating disputes arising out of, employment contracts between its
nationals. However, the problem arises in deﬁning ‘nationality’ of legal
persons, which a majority of international employers are. ‘Nationality’ of legal
153 Rome I, art 8(4). 154 ibid art 8(1).
155 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction’ (n 14).
156 Nuyts (n 68) 43–46.
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persons is usually determined by connecting factors such as the place of
incorporation or corporate seat.157 Since these connecting factors also
determine the domicile of legal persons, the common nationality rule would
ordinarily not open an additional forum to claimant employees. On the other
hand, this jurisdictional basis would eﬀectively give employers access to the
courts of their domicile, which obviously does not accord with the objective of
employee protection. Finally, employee’s domicile or habitual residence has a
rather tenuous connection in cases involving frontier workers and whenever
the employee changes his or her domicile or habitual residence after the
termination of employment but before the commencement of proceedings.158
However, there seems to be one situation where the connecting factor of
employee’s domicile or habitual residence accords with the mentioned con-
siderations. This situation exists when an employer actively seeks out an
employee in the latter’s home country for work abroad, and the parties foresee
that the employee will retain strong connections with his or her home country
and return to that country after the termination of employment. A rule that
confers jurisdiction upon the courts of the employee’s domicile where the
employer takes the initiative to recruit the employee away from his home State
is applied in the United States,159 but it is only active seeking out of employees
that meets the requirements of the ‘minimum contacts’ doctrine and the ‘pur-
poseful availment’ test. The case law of the US courts shows that these tests are
satisﬁed, for example, where the employer advertises in local newspapers and
contacts employees locally (either directly or through an agent),160 uses a local
employment agency,161 actively recruits employees locally for work abroad162
and so forth. Mere hiring of a national employment agency is not enough.163
Jurisdiction is also not allowed where it is the employee who initiates
contact.164
Introducing a rule of jurisdiction of this kind in Brussels I appears to be
consistent with the spirit of that instrument. The rationale of the ‘seeking out’
rule is the existence of a suﬃciently strong connection between the defendant
157 F Vischer, ‘Connecting Factors’ in K Lipstein (ed), International Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law, vol 3 (JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1972) ch 4, 14.
158 Art 115(2) of the Swiss Private International Law Act, which adopts this solution, has been
criticized on the ground that any judgment rendered on this basis has no chance of being recognised
abroad, which makes the protection that it provides illusory: A Bucher, ‘Les nouvelles règles du
droit international privé suisse dans le domaine du droit du travail’ in Le droit social a l’aube du
XXIe siècle: melanges Alexandre Berenstein (Payot 1989) 147, 149.
159 E Scoles and others, Conﬂict of Laws (4th edn, Thomson West 2004) 395–96; see also para
17.042(3) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
160 Runnels v TMSI Contractors, Inc 764 F 2d 417 (5th Cir 1985); Clark v Moran Towing &
Transp Co 738 F Supp 1023 (ED La 1990); Mabry v Fuller-Shuwayer Co, Ltd 50 NC App 245
(1981). 161 Moreno v Milk Train, Inc 182 F Supp 2d 590 (WD Tex 2002).
162 Shah v Nu-Kote International, Inc 898 F Supp 496 (ED Mich 1995); Babineaux v
Southeastern Drilling Corp 170 So 2d 518 (LaApp).
163 Conti v Pneumatic Products Corporation 977 F 2d 978 (6th Cir 1992).
164 Farbman v Esskay Manufacturing Co 676 F Supp 666 (WD NC 1987); Speckine v Stanwick
Int’l Inc 503 F Supp 1055 (WD Mich 1980).
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and the forum, which rationale also underlies some of the existing rules, such
as the rule of general jurisdiction of article 2(1) and the rule of special
jurisdiction of article 5(5). Admittedly, the link between the defendant and the
forum under the proposed ‘seeking out’ rule would usually not be as strong as
under the mentioned rules of the Regulation. Nevertheless, the objective of
employee protection justiﬁes the introduction of such a rule. A parallel can be
made with consumer contracts in this respect. A consumer’s domicile rep-
resents a relevant connecting factor whenever the supplier seeks out the
consumer in his or her home country.165 The proposed ‘seeking out’ rule for
employment disputes is essentially based on the same idea.
If this new rule of jurisdiction and the amendments proposed in the ﬁrst part
of the section were introduced, employees would arguably be accorded a
disproportionate jurisdictional preference. In order to avoid tilting the juris-
dictional scale excessively in employees’ favour, an additional basis of
jurisdiction could also be made available to claimant employers: namely,
claimant employers could be restored the right to initiate proceedings in the
courts for the habitual place of work.166 Several arguments support this
proposition.
First, habitual place of work is a basis of jurisdiction that best satisﬁes the
considerations of proportionality and vindication of important State interests.
The court for this place is usually the proper forum for resolving an em-
ployment dispute. Moreover, this basis does not favour either party a priori, as
the habitual place of work can be in the employee’s or the employer’s country,
or in a third country. What is important is that the employer cannot unilaterally
change the habitual place of work and thereby obtain the beneﬁt of litigating in
a favourable forum. As previously discussed, there must be a combination of
objective and subjective factors on both the employee’s and the employer’s
side in order for the change of place to occur.167 Secondly, both the Brussels
Convention and the 1988 Lugano Convention enabled employers to com-
mence proceedings in the courts for the habitual place of work. There is no
empirical evidence that this rule has had the eﬀect of putting defendant
employees in an unfavourable position.168 Thirdly, denying claimant
165 Brussels I, arts 15(1)(c) and 16(1).
166 The introduction of this jurisdictional basis is also advocated by M Polak ‘ “Laborum dulce
lenimen”? Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Aspects of Employment Contracts’ in J Meeusen, M
Pertegás and G Straetmans (eds), Enforcement of International Contracts in the European Union:
Convergence and Divergence Between Brussels I and Rome I (Intersentia 2004) 323, 326.
167 In order to ensure that employees are given a jurisdictional preference, employers could be
given the right to sue employees in the forum of the habitual place of work only during the
employment relationship, and not once this has come to an end. Such a restriction was envisaged in
art 8(2)(ii) of the 2000 preliminary draft Hague Convention on jurisdiction and foreign judgments
in civil and commercial matters: see PE Nygh and F Pocar, ‘Report on the Preliminary Draft
Convention on jurisdiction and foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters’ (Preliminary
Document No. 11, August 2000) <http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf> , 55–56.
168 ‘Explanatory Memorandum’ (n 38) does not mention any practical reason for denying
claimant employers the right to commence proceedings in the courts for the habitual place of work.
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employers access to the courts for the habitual place of work has led to
practical problems in some Member States. In the Netherlands, for example,
employers who wish to terminate an employment contract have the option to
petition for judicial rescission instead of dismissal. In some cases, judicial
rescission is mandatory.169 Employers from Member States such as this
therefore have considerable practical problems with terminating employment
contracts with employees who work in one of these Member States but live
elsewhere (for example, frontier workers).
In particular, the possibility of introducing new rules of jurisdiction should
be examined in the context of the forthcoming review of Brussels I. The
European Commission has proposed to change this instrument radically by
expanding the scope of its jurisdictional rules to persons not domiciled in the
EU.170 But a simple extension of the existing rules to claims against third
States’ domiciliaries would not be adequate from the standpoint of employee
protection. Admittedly, the position of employees who habitually work for
foreign companies within the EU would be improved. These employees would
be guaranteed the right to initiate proceedings in at least one Member State.171
However, the position of claimant employees who habitually work for foreign
companies outside the EU would be considerably worsened, since those
employees would lose the right to invoke traditional, often excessive, rules of
jurisdiction. Consequently, they could not normally commence proceedings in
the EU since the relevant connecting factors (employer’s domicile and habitual
place of work) would be located outside the EU. Furthermore, the simple
extension of the existing rules could put EU employers in an unfavourable
position whenever their employees move out of the EU after the termination of
employment. In this situation, such employers might not be able to bring
proceedings anywhere in the EU. These considerations therefore support the
introduction of the two additional rules of jurisdiction (the ‘seeking out’ rule
for claimant employees and the rule of the habitual place of work for claimant
employers) proposed above.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of protecting employees by rules of jurisdiction cannot be
achieved unless employees are accorded a jurisdictional preference when they
169 See the Netherlands’ initiative to amend Brussels I by making the courts for the habitual
place of work available to employers in proceedings for termination of employment contracts,
[2002] OJ C311/16, which was rejected by the European Parliament: Parliamentary documents
P5_TA(2003)0353 and A5-0253/2003. See also Written Question E-0785/02 by B Pronk and
others to the Commission of 19 March 2002 and the Commission’s Answer of 21 March 2002
[2002] OJ C309E/47; Written Question E-1517/02 by M Smet to the Commission of 29 May 2002
and the Commission’s Answer of 10 July 2002 [2003] OJ C92E/62.
170 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction’ (n 14) 9.
171 Not all Member States currently give jurisdiction to their courts on the basis of habitual place
of work: see n 69.
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act both as claimants and as defendants. Indisputably, Brussels I protects
defendant employees since it denies employers the use of most of the generally
available bases of jurisdiction. However, not only does the Regulation fail to
accord a jurisdictional preference to claimant employees, it actually puts them
in a less favourable position in comparison to other claimants. First, the rule of
general jurisdiction in employment matters and the rule of the habitual place of
work are somewhat less favourable for employees than the corresponding
generally applicable rules of general jurisdiction and the rule of jurisdiction in
matters relating to a contract for services. Secondly, the rule of the engaging
place of business is deprived of almost any practical importance. Thirdly, the
generally available bases of jurisdiction that are neither contained in Section 5
of Chapter II of the Regulation nor referred to therein, particularly the rule of
jurisdiction over co-defendants, are not available to claimant employees. Given
the theoretical and practical importance of according jurisdictional preference
to claimant employees, Brussels I overall fails to achieve the objective of
employee protection. The reason for this lies in the haphazard evolution of the
relevant rules.
Bearing in mind the forthcoming review of Brussels I, and in particular the
possible widening of the scope of its jurisdictional rules to persons not
domiciled in the EU, the time is ripe for a systematic reassessment of the rules
of jurisdiction in employment matters. The existing rules need to be improved.
However, merely amending them will not suﬃce. Additional rules of
jurisdiction could be introduced: one in favour of claimant employees (the
‘seeking out’ rule), another in favour of claimant employers (the rule of the
habitual place of work). These changes would contribute to more evenly
balanced protection of employees.
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